MODULE 3: Future People

 AGENDA

1. The duty to mitigate
2. Return midterms
3. No office hours today

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John Broome, Climate Matters

Assumes: Our GHG emissions are harming people today and will harm future people. We could reduce our emissions and thereby reduce the harm.

Tuvalu today

Houston space center in 2200

Do we have a duty to reduce our emissions?

If so, is it a duty of justice or a duty of goodness?

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Two types of duties (commonsense morality)

Duties of justice*--

• "Duties of justice are owed by one person to another particular person, or other particular persons; this is their key defining characteristic." (Broome p. 52) 
• We express this by saying the person has a right to be treated a certain way.
• Examples

Duties of goodness--

• "Duties of goodness are not owed to people." (Broome p. 53)
• Examples

*Note: Broome's terminology is different from previous authors. He's not talking about justice in the sense of EJM authors. Duties of justice could just be called "strict obligations."

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Duties of justice compared to duties of goodness

1. Duties of justice are stronger than duties of goodness
2. Duties of justice take priority over duties of goodness

Example

1. People in the big house are having a loud party that does a lot of good for everyone in the house, fulfilling a "duty of goodness"
2. But they're profoundly annoying their neighbor, violating a "duty of justice"
3. The duty of justice comes first, right?

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Duty to stop harming the people of Tuvalu--

A duty of justice because owed to the individuals who live there.

Tuvalu today

Also....(p. 54-59)

1. Harm results from something we do
2. It's serious
3. It's not accidental
4. Impossible to compensate them for harm
5. Our emissions are for our own benefit
6. Harm not reciprocated
7. Can easily reduce

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Duty to reduce for the sake of future people--

If we should reduce for their sake, is it a duty of justice or a duty of goodness?

Flooding after sea level rise in 2200

• at first it seems similar to reducing for the sake of the Tuvaluans
• so a duty of justice?
• but Broome says no....this is a duty of goodness

Broome makes two arguments:

1. Compensation Argument (we may discuss next time)
2. Non-identity Argument

Non-identity argument, background (p. 61-64)

• does it make sense to think we have a duty of justice to SARAH and the unhappy Xs?
• mitigation has to be an international effort--thousands of changed behaviors all over the world
• these changed behaviors will gradually alter who exists
• MARIA and the happier Ys will exist
• Called "non-identity argument" because it turns on the way our efforts wind up changing who exists from one set of people to a different (non-identical) set of people.
  

The argument that reducing for the sake of 2200ers is a duty of goodness

1. By mitigating, we will change who exists from the Xs to the the Ys.
2. We don't owe it to the Xs to mitigate
3. We don't owe it to the Ys to mitigate.
4. We don't owe it to anyone to mitigate.
5. But mitigating does lead to more good--the happier Ys. THEREFORE,
6. Mitigating is not a duty of justice, it's a duty of goodness

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OK, it's a duty of goodness, so what?

1. Broome is not trying to undercut the case for mitigating. He says some duties of goodness are very important.
2. He does say that duties of justice are stronger and more motivating and take priority.
3. So his analysis opens up the possibility that some duty of justice could take priority. Like what?